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Abstract
We study a multi-dimensional collective decision under incomplete informa-
tion. Agents have Euclidean preferences and vote by simple majority on each
issue (dimension), yielding the coordinate-wise median. Judicious rotations of
the orthogonal axes the issues that are voted upon lead to welfare improve-
ments. If the agents types are drawn from a distribution with independent
marginals then, under weak conditions, voting on the original issues is not op-
timal. If the marginals are identical (but not necessarily independent), then
voting rst on the total sum and next on the di¤erences is often welfare supe-
rior to voting on the original issues. We also provide various lower bounds on
incentive e¢ ciency: in particular, if agentstypes are drawn from a log-concave
density with I.I.D. marginals, a second-best voting mechanism attains at least
88% of the rst-best e¢ ciency. Finally, we generalize our method and some
of our insights to preferences derived from distance functions based on inner
products.
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1 Introduction
In 1974 the U.S. Congress changed its budgeting process: instead of considering
appropriations requests that were voted upon one at a time (bottom-up) which resulted
in a gradually determined total level of spending, the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act required voting rst on an overall level of spending, before
the determination of budgets for individual programs in subsequent votes (top-down).
A large literature in the area of public nance (see for example the review articles in
Poterba and von Hagen [1999]) has debated the costs and benets of such procedural
changes, with particular attention to the size of the expected budget decit.1
We analyze the problem of redening (or bundling) the issues brought to vote in a
multi-dimensional collective decision problem. Such methods can increase the welfare
of the involved decision makers by allowing them to reach a consensus that was not
possible on the original issues.
We study a multi-dimensional collective decision taken by simple majority voting:
an example is a legislature that needs to decide on individual budgets for public goods
such as, say, education and defense. Other examples are decisions on the geographical
location of a desirable facility, or decisions on hiring and project adoption that are
based on multi-dimensional attributes.
We adopt the standard spatial model of voting widely used in the political science
literature (see for example, Chapter 5 in Austen-Smith and Banks [2005]), where
voters have preferences characterized by ideal points in each dimension, and by a
quadratic loss caused by deviations from the ideal point.2
Votersideal points are private information, and we study voting by simple ma-
jority on each dimension separately. As we shall see below, this focus yields, in
combination with a decision over the dimensions that are the subject of voting, an
analysis of more generality than immediately apparent.
Voting by simple majority on each dimension yields the coordinate-wise median
of the voters ideal points. This easily follows from Blacks [1948] famous theorem
because the induced preferences are single-peaked on each one-dimensional issue.
In general, this outcome does not coincide with the rst-best, the alternative that
minimizes the sum of squared distances from the individual ideal points. The rst-
best is the coordinate-wise average (or mean) of the realized ideal points, and thus
rst-best welfare is the corresponding variance (with a minus sign).
1There was a widespread belief that the new rules would lead to smaller decits, and the act was
passed almost unanimously in both House and Senate.
2The main text deals with the two-dimensional case, while the generalization to more than two
dimensions is in an Appendix.
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The rst-best is not implementable: each agent has an incentive to try to move the
average closer to his/her ideal point by exaggerating his/her position on one or more
issues.3 Given the tension between rst-best on the one hand and implementable
outcomes on the other, how well does voting by simple majority perform in terms of
welfare? A classical inequality due to Hotelling and Solomons [1932] implies that, for
any distribution of preferences, voting by simple majority on any given issues achieves
at least 50% of the rst-best welfare.
The main insight of the present paper is that a judicious choice of the issues
that are actually put to vote (while maintaining voting by simple majority, with
its desirable incentive properties) can signicantly improve welfare.4 For example,
instead of voting on two separate issues, the legislature could vote on a total budget,
and then on a division of that budget between the two issues just as Congress started
to do in 1974. More generally, we model the repackaging and bundling of issues by
rotations of the orthogonal axes that dene what is put to vote. For example, suppose
voters care about two separate main issues, but they actually vote on the budget of
two agencies that overlap in their responsibility over these two issues. Rotations
correspond then to the shifting of jurisdictions among the two agencies: they change
the mix of issues under the control of each agency.
In inuential work, Shepsle [1979] argued that the division of a complex decision
into several di¤erent jurisdictions (germaneness), creates stable equilibria that would
not be possible in a general, unconstrained collective decision model. His main ex-
amples are legislative committees in the U.S. congress. Viewed in light of Shepsles
theory, our goal is to endogenize the choice of jurisdictions in order to improve welfare,
an issue that has not received much attention in formal studies.
A basic technical observation is that the mean is rotation equivariant (i.e., the
mean after rotation is obtained by rotating the original mean) but the coordinate-
wise median is not.5 As a consequence, a rotation of the axes may decrease the dis-
tance between the coordinate-wise mean (rst-best) and the coordinate-wise median
(outcome of majority voting), thus increasing welfare. The basic cause behind this
phenomenon is the non-linearity of the median function, a feature that yields a rather
complex analysis.6 In order to use calculus and probabilistic/statistical techniques,
3This observation was rst made by Galton [1907], who was also the rst to recommend the
use of the median as a robust and non-manipulable aggregator of opinions. His insights have been
sharpened and much generalized in the literature on robust estimation.
4The idea of comparing voting rules in terms of their expected welfare goes back to Rae [1969].
5See Haldane [1948], or the literature on spatial voting, e.g., Feld and Grofman [1988].
6This is true even for common distributions of types, such as the Gamma, Poisson, lognormal,
etc. Some of our results are based on insights that go back to conjectures by Ramanujan (see Szegö
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we focus here on the limit case where the number of voters is innite.
Our main results are:
1) If the agentsideal points in one dimension are independently distributed from
the ideal points in the other dimension then, under weak conditions on the distribu-
tion of preferences, voting on the original issues is sub-optimal; that is, a re-packaging
of the issues brought to vote via rotation (which necessarily creates some correlation
among the ideal points) increases welfare. This parallels the non-optimality of sepa-
rate sales in the multi-product monopoly problem: some form of mixed bundling is
always superior to separate sales (see McAfee, McMillan and Whinston [1989]).
2) If the marginals of the distribution of agentsideal points are identically dis-
tributed (not necessarily independently), we provide su¢ cient conditions under which
the 45-degree rotation welfare is superior to no rotation. The conditions are satised
by common distribution with I.I.D. marginals. We show that, with I.I.D. marginals,
the 45-degree rotation is always a critical point, and also provide su¢ cient conditions
for the 45-degree rotation to be welfare maximizing. A key observation for these
results is that, under the symmetry of the marginals, the 45-degree rotation entirely
eliminates the conict arising between e¢ ciency and majority voting in one dimension
all remaining conict is concentrated in the other, orthogonal dimension.
3)We provide various lower bounds on incentive e¢ ciency for large, non-parametric
families of distributions of ideal points (such as unimodal distributions, distributions
with an increasing hazard rate, etc.). For example, if agentsideal points are drawn
from a log-concave density with I.I.D. marginals, a voting mechanism that involves
a 45-degree rotation of the original dimensions attains at least 88% of the rst-best
e¢ ciency.
4) We extend our method to the more general class of preferences induced by
distance functions generated by inner-product norms. In particular, for weighted
Euclidean norms, we show that voting on independent issues remains sub-optimal
under the same su¢ cient conditions as for the Euclidean preferences.
It is possible to perform a similar analysis for goals other than e¢ ciency, e.g.,
dene jurisdictions that serve other purposes, such as the self-interest of an agenda
setter, or of a coalition of voters. Ferejohn and Krehbiel [1987] focused on controlling
budgetary growth rather than e¢ ciency, and they observed that the 1974 budget
reform can be represented by a 45-degree rotation of the coordinates on which voting
takes place. For that goal, we o¤er here precise conditions comparing the top-down
and bottom-up procedures in terms of the total budget they produce, and we show
that the budgeting reform can unambiguously improve welfare while having amixed
[1928]) and Hadamard.
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impact on the budget size.
To see how our results may t practical voting environments, consider a legislative
committee that decides on spending on several items. Each committee member has a
preferred expenditure for each item. If the items are independent (i.e, the preferred
expenditure level on one item is uncorrelated with the preferred one on another item)
then it is not optimal to directly vote on the proposed expenditures. Instead, it
may be better to vote on the budgets of two agencies that have some overlapping
jurisdictions representing a particular mix of the two issues (this is a non-zero rotation
in our framework). In another example, if a committee nances regional hospitals,
say, that have similar sizes and serve similar purposes, our analysis suggests that it
is better to rst decide the total budget for these hospitals and then divide it among
hospitals. Finally, if a government, say, has to fund an activity for multiple years, it
may be better rst vote on a multi-year budget and then decide how to allocate the
total budget among di¤erent years.
1.1 Related Literature
The existence of a Condorcet winner is rare in multi-dimensional models of voting
(Kramer [1973]). Kramer [1972] observed, however, that voting in a variety of in-
stitutions is often sequential, issue by issue, and he established the existence of a
sophisticated voting equilibrium if voters preferences are continuous, convex and
separable. The coordinate-wise median obtained by simple-majority voting in each
dimension  constitutes a basic instance of a structure induced equilibrium in the
spirit of Shepsle [1979].7
Technically, our contribution builds upon and relates to several important and ele-
gant contributions due to Moulin [1980], Border and Jordan [1983], Kim and Rousch
[1984], and Peters, van der Stel and Storcken [1992]. In a one-dimensional setting
with single-peaked preferences, Moulin considered mechanisms that depend on re-
ported peaks, and characterized the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible
(DIC), anonymous and Pareto e¢ cient mechanisms: each mechanism in this class is
obtained by choosing the median among the n reported peaks of the real voters and
the peaks of a set of n  1 phantomvoters (these are xed by the mechanism, and
do not vary with the reports).8 Border and Jordan [1983] removed Moulins assump-
tion whereby mechanisms depend only on peaks, and generalized Moulins nding
7In a multi-dimensional voting model with common interest, aggregate uncertainty, and two truth-
motivated candidates, McMurray [2018] shows that, in equilibrium, multiple issues are consistently
bundled along the 45-degree line (the major diagonal in his model).
8Relaxing Pareto e¢ ciency yields the same characterization, but requires n+ 1 phantoms.
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to a multi-dimensional setting with separable and quadratic preferences: each DIC
mechanism is decomposable into a collection of one-dimensional DIC mechanisms,
each described by the location of the phantom voters in the respective dimension (see
also Barbera, Gul and Stacchetti [1993]).9
Gershkov, Moldovanu and Shi [2017] analyzed welfare maximization in a one-
dimensional setting with cardinal utilities, and derived the ex-ante welfare maximizing
placement of phantoms. They also showed how to avoid the phantom interpretation
by implementing Moulins mechanisms via a sequential, binary voting procedure to-
gether with a exible qualied majority schedule.10 Combining their result with the
Border-Jordan decomposition yields the welfare maximizing mechanism for multi-
dimensional settings with separable and quadratic preferences. But, the ensuing
solution, described by an optimal placement of phantoms in each dimension, is not
satisfactory from a practical point of view: it implies that each issue (dimension) in
each multi-dimensional problem must be voted upon according to a particular insti-
tution that is sensitive to both utilities and distribution of types. Such exibility may
be di¢ cult, if not impossible, to achieve in practice.
Instead, we x here an ubiquitous institution voting by simple majority on each
issue but we allow exibility in the design of the issues that are actually put to
vote. Such a limited form of agenda design is common in practice, and, as we shall
see, has important welfare consequences.
The simplest multi-dimensional setting is the one with Euclidean preferences:
intuitively, the presence of spherically symmetric preferences does not a-priori deter-
mine the dimensions of the Border and Jordan decomposition into one-dimensional
mechanisms. Indeed, Kim and Rousch [1984] showed that the set of continuous,
anonymous and DIC mechanisms can be described by performing the Border-Jordan
analysis subsequent to any translation of the origin and any rotation of the orthogo-
nal axes.11 Peters, van der Stel and Storcken [1992] showed that, for two dimensions
with odd number of voters, voting by simple majority in each dimension (after any
translation/rotation of the plane) is also Pareto e¢ cient.12
9Most papers in the literature indeed assume separable preferences. Ahn and Oliveros [2012] is a
notable exception: they prove equilibrium existence in combinatorial voting with non-separable pref-
erences, and provide conditions under which the Condorcet winner is implemented in the equilibrium
of large elections.
10See also Kleiner and Moldovanu [2017] for general su¢ cient conditions under which sequential,
binary voting procedures possess desirable properties.
11Since both median and mean are translation equivariant, translations of the origin cannot im-
prove welfare. It is therefore without loss of generality to restrict attention here to rotations.
12They show that a mechanism is Pareto e¢ cient if and only if, for any realization of agentsideal
points, its allocation lies in the convex hull of the ideal points. With two or more dimensions, a
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Finally, it is also instructive to compare our results to those in the classical papers
by Caplin and Nalebu¤ ([1988], [1991]).13 These authors did not consider incomplete
information and incentive constraints. Instead, motivated by the instability of multi-
dimensional voting, they considered the e¤ect of super-majority requirements on the
stability of the spatial mean. For a large number of voters and for a log-concave
density governing the distribution of types (and also for other, more general forms
of concavity), Caplin and Nalebu¤ showed that, once established as status-quo, the
mean cannot be displaced by another alternative if the selection of that alternative
requires a super-majority of at least 64% (or 1   1
e
). In other words, any coalition
that prefers an alternative over the mean contains less than 64% of the voters, and is
thus not e¤ective.
As mentioned above, for the log-concave case with I.I.D. marginals, our results
display a mechanism that is incentive compatible for any (odd) number of voters and
that achieves at least 88% of the rst-best utility when this number goes to innity.
Thus, issue by issue simple majority voting on appropriately dened dimensions con-
stitutes an intuitive and incentive compatible institutional arrangement that is almost
e¢ cient in this case. Moreover, the relative e¢ ciency of this mechanism increases,
and tends to 100%, when we increase the number of dimensions of the underlying
problem.
Although our setting bears some similarity to multi-dimensional cheap talk, the
logic of welfare gains is very di¤erent here. In those models, the multiplicity of issues
helps because it improves information transmission between the sender(s) and the
receiver. In a model with two senders Battaglini [2002] shows that, as long as the two
sendersideal points are linearly independent, full information revelation is possible
by carefully choosing dimensions to exploit the conict between senders. In a one-
sender model, Chakraborty and Harbaugh [2007] show that the sender can credibly
convey his ranking of di¤erent issues to the receiver. In our model rotations address
a very di¤erent conict, one between simple majority voting and e¢ ciency.
2 The Model
We consider n (odd) agents who collectively decide about two issues, X and Y , on a
convex region D  R2. Each agents ideal position on these two issues is given by a
peak ti = (xi; yi); i = 1; 2; :::; n: The peak ti is agent is private information. Each
generalized median with phantoms may lie ouside of the convex hull.
13These papers were also the rst to use modern concentration inequalities in the Economics
literature.
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agent i has a utility function of the form
  jjti   vjj2
where the point v 2 D denotes the chosen alternative and where jjjj is the standard
Euclidean (l2) norm. The peaks ti = (xi; yi) are independently, identically distributed
(I.I.D.) across agents, according to a joint distribution F (xi; yi); with density f . De-
note by X (Y ) the expected value of xi (yi). Throughout the paper, we assume
that E jjtijj2 <1 for all ti.
A utilitarian planner would choose v 2 D to maximize the average of the agents
ex ante utilities, or equivalently, minimize the expected average squared distance from
the voterspeaks:
min
v2D
E
"
1
n
nX
i=1
jjti   vjj2
#
;
subject to agentsincentive constraints. Ignoring the agentsincentives, the planner
would choose a point u that minimizes the average of ex post distances:
u 2 arg min
v2D
1
n
nX
i=1
jjti   vjj2 ;
which we will refer to as the rst-best solution. For each xed realization (t1; t2; :::; tn),
it is well known that the rst-best solution is simply the mean of the ideal points
u = t  1
n
nX
i=1
ti:
Hence, the rst-best (per capita) expected utility is the variance (with negative sign)
  1
n
nX
i=1
ti   t2 :
In Section 5, we shall extend our analysis to preferences generated by other norms
induced by inner products.
2.1 Re-packaging Issues via Rotations
We consider voting by simple majority on each separate dimension. Our focus on
simple majority voting stems from its wide applicability and its actual use in practice.
We do not a priori restrict the issues on the ballot to be X and Y . Instead, new issues
can be created through re-packaging and bundlingthe basic issues X and Y .
We model packaging and bundling of issues through rotations in the plane. Recall
that, for xed Cartesian coordinates, rotating a point (x; y) 2 R2 counter-clockwise
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by an angle of  can be represented by the multiplication of the vector (x; y) with a
rotation matrix R (). The resulting, rotated vector (z ; z+) is given then by 
z 
z+
!
=
 
cos    sin 
sin  cos 
!
| {z }
R()
 
x
y
!
=
 
x cos    y sin 
x sin  + y cos 
!
:
Equivalently, one can obtain (z ; z+) by rotating the original Cartesian coordinates
clockwise around the xed origin by an angle of  to obtain new orthogonal coordi-
nates, and then projecting (x; y) to the new coordinates.
Let (Z ; Z+) denote the new random vector obtained from rotating the random
vector (X; Y ) by an angle of :
Z  () = X cos    Y sin ; (1)
Z+ () = X sin  + Y cos : (2)
Voters then vote on the new issues Z  and Z+, instead of the original issuesX and Y .14
By the simple majority rule, the voting outcome will be (m  (; t1; :::; tn) ;m+ (; t1; :::; tn))
where
m  (; t1; :::; tn) = median (x1 cos    y1 sin ; :::; xn cos    yn sin ), (3)
m+ (; t1; :::; tn) = median (x1 sin  + y1 cos ; :::; xn sin  + yn cos ), (4)
are the marginal medians after the rotation.15
It is easy to verify that the mean t of t1; :::; tn is rotation equivariant, i.e. the
mean of rotated peaks is simply the rotated mean of the original peaks. In marked
contrast, the marginal medians (m  (; t1; :::; tn) ;m+ (; t1; :::; tn)) are not rotation
equivariant, i.e., rotating and taking medians is not the same as taking medians
and rotating. Therefore, rotations are instruments by which the planner may use to
inuence welfare. To illustrate, consider Figure 1 below with three voters. A, B, and C
are votersideal points. Original coordinates are drawn in green, rotated coordinates
are drawn in red. The green star is the outcome of voting along the original axes
(x; y). The red one is the outcome of voting along the rotated axes (x0; y0). It is clear
that the mean of ideal points is rotation equivariant, the median is not.
14We abuse here notation by denoting by the same capital letters both the underlying dimen-
sions (or issues) and the random variables governing the distribution of peaks on those respective
dimensions.
15Other than marginal median, there are several other multivariate generalizations of univariate
median. See Small [1990] for a review of di¤erent denitions of multi-dimensional medians and their
(lack of) equivariance properties.
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Figure 1: Median is not rotation equivariant.
The reason for this complex behavior is the non-linearity of the median of random
variables under convolutions, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 1 Let (X; Y ) denote a random vector on the plane. Suppose that X and Y
are I.I.D. exponentially distributed with fX (x) = e x for all x  0 and fY (y) = e y
for all y  0. The means are X = Y = 1 and the medians are mX = mY =
ln 2. Rotating the coordinates clockwise by 
4
and then projecting (X; Y ) to the new
coordinates, yield a new random vector (Z ; Z+) = (
p
2
2
X  
p
2
2
Y;
p
2
2
X +
p
2
2
Y ). Z  is
symmetric, so its median and mean are both equal to zero, and the mean of Z+ equalsp
2
2
(X + Y ) =
p
2. In contrast, the median of Z+ is not equal to
p
2
2
(mX +mY ), or
equivalently, mX+Y 6= mX +mY . To see this, note that the density of X + Y is given
by
fX+Y (z) =
Z 1
 1
fX (z   t) fY (t) dt =
Z z
0
e (z t)e tdt = ze z, for all z  0.
Since
FX+Y (mX +mY ) =
Z 2 ln 2
0
ze zdz =
3
4
  1
2
ln 2  0:4 < FX+Y (mX+Y ) = 1=2;
it follows that mX+Y > mX +mY .
More generally, we could also consider an additional translation of the origin, say
by a vector w, to obtain new orthogonal coordinates (and thus create new issues).
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The joint operation of rotation and translation can also be represented by a linear
matrix.16 But, medians (and means) are translation equivariant, and thus there is
no extra welfare advantage from such translations. Therefore, we focus below on the
family of rotations - the linear isometries with determinant +1 that x the origin -
described by the angle of rotation  relative to standard Cartesian coordinates.
2.2 The Set of Voting Mechanisms
For any rotation angle  2 [0; 2], we dene the direct marginal median mechanism
' as
' (t1; t2; :::; tn) = (m  (; t1; ::; tn) ;m+ (; t1; ::; tn)) ; (5)
where (m  (; t1; ::; tn) ;m+ (; t1; ::; tn)) is the marginal median with respect to ro-
tation  and reported peaks ti as dened in (3) and (4). Since both rotations and
medians are continuous functions, ' (t1; t2; :::; tn) is continuous in  and in all its
other arguments.
A direct revelation mechanism  (ti; t i) is dominant-strategy incentive compati-
ble (DIC) if, for any voter i, any realizations ti and t i; and any reporting strategy
prole t^ i(t i) of other voters, voter is utility  
ti     ti; t^ i(t i)2 is maximized
by truthfully revealing his type ti. It is easily seen that the direct revelation mecha-
nism ' dened in (5) is DIC. Surprisingly, as shown by Kim and Roush [1984] and
Peters et al. [1992], the set of marginal median mechanisms (for all possible rotations)
coincides with the entire class of anonymous, Pareto e¢ cient and DIC mechanisms.17
This provides a complementary justication for our focus on simple-majority voting
mechanisms.
The mechanism ' can be decentralized (via an indirect mechanism) by rst den-
ing the issues (via rotations) and then voting sequentially by simple majority, one issue
at a time, using a binary, sequential voting procedure with a convex agenda (such as
16This set of general transformation matrices (rotation and translation) is called the special or-
thogonal group for the plane, and is denoted by SO(2). Each matrix in SO (2) is an orthogonal
matrix. It is special because the determinant of each matrix is +1, whereas the determinant could
be  1 for other orthogonal transformations such as reections. Rotations form the subgroup that
xes the origin.
17A mechanism  is anonymous if, for any prole of reports (ti; t i),  (t1; :::; ti; :::; tn) =
 
 
tp(1); :::; tp(i); :::; tp(n)

; where p is any permutation of the set f1; :::; ng. A mechanism  is
Pareto e¢ cient (or Pareto optimal) if, for any prole of reports (ti; t i), there is no alternative v
such that jjti   vjj2  jjti    (ti; t i)jj2 for all i, with strict inequality for at least one agent. Note
that their characterization fails in higher dimensions because anonymous, Pareto e¢ cient and DIC
mechanisms need not exist. Hence, our analysis can be extended to higher dimensional problems,
but the solution need not be ex-post Pareto e¢ cient.
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those used by all democratic legislatures).18 The overall outcome does not depend on
the order in which the issues are put up to vote, and is the vector of marginal medians
(m  (; t1; :::; tn) ;m+ (; t1; :::; tn)). This forms an incidence of the structure induced
equilibrium à la Shepsle [1979].
Two rotation angles,  = 0 and  = =4; are of particular interest and have natural
interpretations. When  = 0, voters are asked to vote on the original issues X and
Y . For  = =4 we have
m  (=4; t1; :::; tn) =
p
2
2
median (x1   y1; :::; xn   yn),
m+ (=4; t1; :::; tn) =
p
2
2
median (x1 + y1; :::; xn + yn).
Therefore, under the =4 rotation, the vote is on issues X + Y and X   Y , rather
than on X and Y . Once voters have decided on X + Y and X   Y , the planner can
then obviously recover X and Y . The two-step voting procedure associated with the
=4-rotation resembles the top-downbudgeting procedure widely used in practice:
rst a total budget is determined, and then it is allocated among several items. On
the other hand, the voting procedure associated with the 0-rotation resembles the
bottom-up budgeting procedure: agents vote on separate budgets for individual
items, and the total budget is gradually obtained as the sum of the individual budgets.
Remark 1 We focus here on orthogonal coordinates. This is without loss of general-
ity: for any equilibrium outcome obtained by voting along coordinates generated by a
non-orthogonal base, there always exists an orthogonal base that yields the same vot-
ing outcome. The di¤erence is that under a non-orthogonal base, the order in which
the issues are put up to vote does matter. To illustrate, consider the following stan-
dard implementation of the =4 rotation in practice: after the total sum (X +Y ) was
determined, voters are asked to vote on X (or on Y ) rather than on the orthogonal
di¤erence (X   Y ). We show that as long as (X + Y ) is voted upon rst, any issue
voted upon at the second stage that is not colinear with X + Y will yield the same
equilibrium outcome as under voting according to (X   Y ). To see this, consider the
case where voters vote rst on X + Y; and then on X; and the second-stage strategy
of voter i with ideal point (xi; yi) : The rst stage decision imposes then a budget line
18At each stage of convex, sequential procedure on a xed dimension, a binary decision is collec-
tively taken among two ideologically coherent sets of alternatives that create a clear left-right divide.
For details see Gershkov, Moldovanu and Shi [2017] and Kleiner and Moldovanu [2017].
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(the purple dash line in Figure 2) on which the nal voting outcome must lie.
Figure 2. Alternative implementation of the top-down procedure.
Let A and B denote the points obtained by projecting (xi; yi) on the budget line, and
on the X axis, respectively, and let D denote the projection A to the X axis. Then, at
the second stage voting on X, voter is dominant strategy is to vote for point D rather
than point B : whenever i is pivotal, voting D yields point A on the budget line, which
is closest to his ideal point. On the other hand, A is exactly the point that i would
have voted for if the second stage vote were on the di¤erence X   Y . Note that the
above argument is independent of the number of voters and can be easily generalized
to other non-orthogonal bases.
3 The Limit Case when the Number of Agents Is
Large
The full probabilistic optimization problem can be rewritten as
(P0) min
2[0;2]
Z
D
:::
Z
D
 
1
n
nX
i=1
jjR () ti   ' (t1; t2; :::; tn)jj2
!
f(t1):::f(tn)dt1:::dtn:
We focus here on the solution to problem (P0) when the number of agents is large.
The resulting optimal mechanism will be incentive compatible, Pareto e¢ cient and
anonymous for any (odd) number of voters. For I.I.D. random variables fXig1i=1 with
nite mean X and variance 
2
X , we know from the central limit theorem that
p
n
 
1
n
nX
i=1
Xi   X
!
! N(0; 2X):
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Bahadur (1966) shows that the quantiles of large samples display a similar behavior.
In particular,
p
n(X(n+1)=2:n  mX)! N

0;
1
4f 2(mX)

;
where X(n+1)=2:n is the median order statistic, and where mX is the median of the
distribution. Thus, as n goes to innity, the sample median converges to the median
of the underlying distribution and, of course, the sample mean converges to the mean.
By applying the above limit results to our setting, we obtain that, as n!1, 
m  (; t1; ::; tn)
m+ (; t1; ::; tn)
!
 !
 
m  ()
m+ ()
!

 
median (X cos    Y sin )
median (X sin  + Y cos )
!
:
Furthermore, since the norm jjjj is continuous, we obtain that, as n!1,
1
n
nX
i=1
jjR () ti   ' (t1; t2; :::; tn)jj2
=
1
n
nX
i=1

(xi cos    yi sin   m  (; t1; ::; tn))2 + (xi sin  + yi cos   m+ (; t1; ::; tn))2

! E jjX cos    Y sin   m (); X sin  + Y cos   m+()jj2
= 2X + 
2
Y +
 
  () m  ()
2
+
 
+ () m+ ()
2
;
where the two coordinates of the rotated mean are
  () = X cos    Y sin , and + () = X sin  + Y cos :
Therefore, in the limit where n is very large, the problem becomes
(P1) min
2[0;2]
 
  () m  ()
2
+
 
+ () m+ ()
2
+ 2X + 
2
Y :
In other words, we look for the rotation that creates the marginal median vector with
the minimum distance from the mean.
For most parts of the analysis below, it will be convenient to normalize the means
of X and Y to be zero such a normalization is without loss of generality because of
the translational equivariance of both mean and median. Let us dene the normalized
random variables ~X and ~Y as
~X = X   X and ~Y = Y   Y :
The corresponding normalized marginal medians ( ~m  () ; ~m+ ()) are
~m  () = m  ()    () and ~m+ () = m+ ()  + () :
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We further note that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to rotations
in the interval [0; =2]. That is because, for any  2 [=2; 2] that minimizes the
planners objective, there exists 0 2 [0; =2] that attains the same minimum.19 Hence,
the planners problem can be rewritten as
(P2) min
2[0;=2]
~m2  () + ~m
2
+ () + 
2
X + 
2
Y :
Since variances are xed, the planners goal under this normalization is simply to nd
the rotation resulting in a marginal median vector with minimum norm. To simplify
notation, we shall drop the tilde symbol for normalized random variables where no
confusion can arise.
Remark 2 We would like to comment here on the feasibility of the rst-best solution.
1. With a continuum of voters, the planner could, in principle, dictate the mean as
the collective choice without seeking any input from the voters. But, this would
require detailed knowledge about the joint distribution of individualspreferences.
In contrast, voting by simple majority in each dimension is practical and indeed
often observed in reality because it is always incentive compatible, and because
its execution does not require any prior knowledge about the distribution. None
of our theorems or propositions (e.g., Theorems 1-3, Propositions 1-3) requires
the planner to know the exact distribution: it is su¢ cient to know that the joint
distribution belongs to a broad class.
2. If the number of voters is nite, the rst-best solution, dened as the sample
mean of the voters ideal points, is not implementable because each agent can
advantageously move the mean towards her ideal point by reporting a false peak.
The individual inuence on the mean is unbounded (unless the distribution of
peaks is on a bounded interval). Thus, even if the number of voters is large, the
possibility to tilt the mean in ones favor may still be substantial.
3.1 Sub-Optimality of Voting on Independent Issues
In this subsection, we assume that the unrotated marginalsX and Y are independent.
We work on the normalized version of the planners problem (P2) and show that the
zero-rotation yields a local maximum of the norm of the normalized marginal median,
i.e., it leads to a local utility minimum.
19This claim is a direct consequence of simple trigonometric identities, and we omit the proof.
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Theorem 1 Assume that X and Y are independent. The rotation with angle  = 0 is
a local utility minimum if
mXf
0
X (mX)  0;mY f 0Y (mY )  0;m2X +m2Y 6= 0. (6)
Proof. See Appendix A.
If random variables X and Y are unimodal, then the rotation of  = 0 is a
local utility minimum if the median lies between the mode and the mean.20 This
alternative su¢ cient condition is simple and intuitive: there are elegant, general
characterizations of distributions where such orders of the mode, median and mean
hold (see for example, Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev [1988], Basu and DasGupta
[1997]).
Corollary 1 Assume that X and Y are independent and m2X + m
2
Y 6= 0. Suppose
that X and Y are unimodal and satisfy
MX  mX  X or X  mX MX
MY  mY  Y or Y  mY MY
whereM;m;  are mode, median and mean, respectively. Then the rotation with angle
 = 0 is a local utility minimum.
Proof. If MX  mX  X = 0 (where the last equality holds by normalization),
then mX  0 and f 0(mX)  0 because mX is to the right of the mode. Hence
mXf
0
X (mX)  0: If 0 = X  mX MX , then mX  0 and f 0(mX)  0 because mX
is to the left of the mode. Hence mXf 0X (mX)  0; and analogously for Y .
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds as follows: the rotation  = 0 yields a local
maximum of the norm of the normalized marginal median if it is a critical point
m (0)m0 (0) +m+(0)m
0
+(0) = 0; (7)
and if it satises the following local second-order condition
m00 (0)m (0) + (m
0
 (0))
2 +m00+(0)m+(0) + (m
0
+(0))
2 < 0: (8)
The proof veries that m0 (0) = m
0
+(0) = 0 (so condition (7) is trivially satised),
and that condition (6) in Theorem 1 implies condition (8).
20A random variable Z is unimodal if its density f(z) has a single mode (or peak).
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The geometric intuition of the sub-optimality of voting on independent issues is
illustrated in Figure 3 below:
Figure 3. Small rotation improves welfare.
Assume that 0 = X  mX and 0 = Y  mY . We want to show that a small rotation
improves welfare if f 0X (mX)  0 and f 0Y (mY )  0. Assume that the unrotated median
is B. Therefore, by independence, there is a mass of 50% above the AC line and a
mass of 50% to the right of GH line. Consider a small rotation with angle  > 0,
so that new axes are x0 and y0. We want to show that this shifts the new median
towards the mean (0; 0);i.e., that the median moves towards the south-west. Consider
the projection of B onto the new, rotated axes: the result obtains if the mass above
DE and the mass to the right of LM are both below 50%. If the area of ABE is larger
than the one of BCD, we obtain that the mass above ED is indeed smaller than 0:5
(the comparison for the other dimension is analogous).
For illustration purpose, let us assume that X and Y distribute on bounded inter-
vals [a1; a2] and [b1; b2], respectively. The line DE passing through point B is given
by y = mY + (mX   x) tan . Therefore, the di¤erence between the areas ABE and
BCD is
ABE  BCD =
Z a2
a1
[FY (mY + (mX   x) tan )  FY (mY )] fX (x) dx:
Since f 0Y (mY )  0, FY is locally convex at mY . Therefore, for su¢ ciently small
, the curve FY (mY + (mX   x) tan ) with x 2 [a1; a2] lies above the tangent line
FY (mY ) + fY (mY ) (mX   x) tan . That is,
FY (mY + (mX   x) tan )  FY (mY ) + fY (mY ) (mX   x) tan :
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As a result, for su¢ ciently small , we have
ABE  BCD 
Z a2
a1
fY (mY ) (mX   x) tan fX (x) dx = fY (mY )mX tan  > 0;
as desired. The argument for the other dimension is analogous.
Intuitively, area ABE represents voters who have their preferred y coordinate
marginally above mY and who, after rotation, would switch their support from alter-
natives above the line y = mY to alternatives below the line y0 = mY . In contrast,
area BCD represents voters who have their y coordinate marginally below mY and
who would switch their support from alternatives below the line y = mY to alter-
natives above the line y0 = mY . Since F (y) is locally convex at y = mY , there are
more voters in area ABE than in BCD, and thus more than half of them will vote for
alternatives below the line y0 = mY . That is, the median after the rotation will be
closer to the origin (the rst best).
3.2 The =4-Rotation
In this subsection, we assume that X and Y are identically (but not necessarily
independently) distributed. By symmetry,
m  (=4) = median(
p
2
2
(X   Y )) = 0 =   (=4) ;
and
m+ (=4) = median (
p
2
2
(X + Y )) =
p
2
2
median (X + Y ) :
Hence, the =4-rotation is a natural candidate for improving welfare. It completely
eliminates the conict arising between e¢ ciency and incentive compatibility along
one dimension  all remaining conict is concentrated in the other dimension, as
illustrated in the following gure (assuming mX > X = 0) where (mX ;mY ) is the
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unrotated median and the red star is the =4-rotated median m+ (=4):
Figure 4. The =4-rotation with symmetric marginals.
Proposition 1 Suppose that X and Y are I.I.D., and the density fX satises the
following regularity condition:
lim
x!1
fX
p
2m+ (=4)  x

fX (x)

2x 
p
2m+ (=4)
2
= 0;
lim
x! 1
fX
p
2m+ (=4)  x

fX (x)

2x 
p
2m+ (=4)
2
= 0:
Then  = =4 is a critical point, i.e., it satises the rst order condition.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The above regularity condition is satised if the distribution has a bounded sup-
port or a thin tail. If we could verify second-order conditions either locally or globally,
then Proposition 1 could tell us whether  = =4 is a local or global utility maximum.
Unfortunately, the second order conditions, evaluated at  = =4, turn out to be very
elusive.
Our next result o¤ers su¢ cient conditions for the optimality of the =4-rotation.
It requires the following denition.
Denition 1 A vector (a; b) is said to majorize (a0; b0), written as (a; b)  (a0; b0), if
a+ b = a0+ b0 and if max(a; b)  max fa0; b0g. A function h (a; b) is said to be Schur-
convex (concave) in (a; b) if h (a00; b00)  ()h (a0; b0) whenever (a00; b00)  (a0; b0).
Proposition 2 Suppose that X and Y are identically distributed and mX 6= X . The
=4-rotation attains the welfare maximum if either
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1. m+() < +() for all  2

0; 
4

, and the function
Pr (X sin  + Y cos   z)
is Schur-concave in (sin2 ; cos2 ) for all  2 0; 
4

and all z 2 [mX ; 0];
or
2. m+() > +() for all  2

0; 
4

, and the function
Pr (X sin  + Y cos   z)
is Schur-convex in (sin2 ; cos2 ) for all  2 0; 
4

and z 2 [0;mX ].
Proof. See Appendix A.
If Pr (X sin  + Y cos   z) is Schur-concave for all  2 0; 
4

, and if the rotated
median is always below the mean, it must hold that
mX  mX sin +Y cos   mp2
2
X+
p
2
2
Y
 X :
Hence, the distance between the mean and the rotated median mX sin +Y cos  is small-
est when  = =4. The su¢ cient conditions in Proposition 2 only involve the models
primitives (i.e., the distributions of types) and can be, in principle, checked for any
distribution.21
For example, we veried that Pr (X sin  + Y cos   z) is Schur-concave if X and
Y are I.I.D. exponential and thus the =4-rotation is globally optimal in that case.22
For other standard distributions such as gamma, Pareto and Rayleigh, we used Math-
ematica to plot the aggregate expected welfare as a function of the rotation angle
 2 [0; =2]. Our simulations suggest that the =4-rotation is optimal for these distri-
butions, but we were unable to analytically prove it. In general, the =4-rotation may
not be optimal, as illustrated by Example 2 below. Therefore, some restrictions on
the symmetric marginals are indeed necessary for the optimality of the =4-rotation.
Example 2 Let (X; Y ) denote a random vector on the plane. Suppose that X and
Y are I.I.D. according to the following discrete distribution:
values of X 0 0:45 1
probability 0:4 0:3 0:3
21Similar Schur-concavity/convexity conditions appear in the literature: For example, if X;Y are
non-negative I.I.D. random variables with a log-concave density then Pr(aX + bY  z) is known
to be Schur-concave function of (a2; b2) for all z (see Karlin and Rinott [1983]). We cannot directly
use this result because of the non-negativity restriction.
22The verication details for the exponential distribution are available upon request.
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so that X = Y = 0:435 and mX = mY = 0:45. The distribution of X + Y is given
by
values of X + Y 0 0:45 0:90 1 1:45 2
probability 0:16 0:24 0:09 0:24 0:18 0:09
so that X+Y = 0:87 and mX+Y = 1. The expected utility from the 0-rotation is
 2 (X  mX)2 =  2 (0:435  0:45)2 =  0:000 45
and the expected utility from the =4-rotation is
 
 p
2
2
 
X+Y  mX+Y
!2
=  
 p
2
2
(0:87  1)
!2
=  0:008 45
Therefore, the =4-rotation is strictly dominated by the 0-rotation. Since the welfare
dominance is strict, we can approximate the discrete distribution by a continuous
distribution and maintain it.
3.3 When does Top-DownDominate Bottom-Up?
We now compare the expected utility under the =4-rotation with that under the
0-rotation. As is apparent from Figure 4, this amounts to check whether the orig-
inal coordinate-wise median vector (mX ;mY ) is closer to the origin than the new
coordinate-wise median vector (mX+Y =2;mX+Y =2). Therefore, if mX < X and
mX + mY < mX+Y , or if mX > X and mX + mY > mX+Y , then the =4-rotation
dominates the zero-rotation.
Assuming that X and Y are I.I.D., we present below a simple su¢ cient condition
that simultaneously guarantees mX < (>)X and mX + mY < (>)mX+Y .
23 The
need to control for sub/super-additivity of medians parallel the conditions on second-
highest order statistics for bundling in auctions (see Palfrey [1983]).
Proposition 3 Suppose that X and Y are I.I.D. and that mX 6= X . The expected
utility at  = 
4
exceeds the expected utility at  = 0 if either
FX (mX + ") + FX (mX   ")  1 for all " > 0; (9)
23As is illustrated in Example 1, both condition mX < X and the super-additivity condition
mX + mY < mX+Y hold for the exponential distribution which is strictly concave. We show in
Section 7.5 of Appendix A that the super-additivity condition is satised for the gamma distribution
(a generalization of the exponential) and the Rayleigh distribution, where the su¢ cient condition
(9) may not be easily checked, or does not hold. There we also construct, by using a copula, an
example where independence is not necessary for the =4-rotation to dominate the 0-rotation.
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or
FX (mX + ") + FX (mX   ")  1 for all " > 0: (10)
In particular, condition (9) implies mX < X and mX +mY < mX+Y , and is satised
if FX is strictly concave. Condition (10) implies mX > X and mX + mY > mX+Y ,
and is satised if FX is strictly convex.
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is worth noting that van Zwet [1979] shows that condition (9) implies X >
mX > MX and (10) implies X < mX < MX . It follows from Corollary 1 that each
of the two conditions is also su¢ cient for the zero-rotation to be sub-optimal.
Remark 3 Whenever the median function is super (sub)-additive, the top-down pro-
cedure where a total budget is determined rst leads to a higher (lower) overall budget
than the bottom-up procedure where votes are item-by-item and where the total budget
is gradually determined.24
4 Bounds on Relative E¢ ciency
In this section we provide several lower bounds on the (relative) e¢ ciency loss of
the marginal median mechanisms augmented by rotations. We keep the assumption
that the number of agents is large. The various bounds are obtained under di¤erent
distributional assumptions governing the distribution of voters ideal points, and the
proofs use several classical statistical inequalities, and some more recent concentration
inequalities. In particular, for the logconcave case studied by Caplin and Nalebu¤
([1988], [1991]), the lower bound is 88% of the rst-best utility.
Note that each assertion in the following Theorem holds for a large class of dis-
tributions, and therefore that the results do not require exact knowledge of the par-
ticular distribution (as long as it is known that it belongs to the respective class).
In particular, the optimal rotation achieves, in each case, a possibly higher relative
e¢ ciency.
Assume that ideal points are distributed such that the marginals are given by
random variables (X; Y ) where X and Y are not necessarily identical, and are poten-
tially correlated. Since the results heavily use statistical results that establish relations
between the mean, median and variance, we work here with the non-normalized
variables (so that the role of the mean and its relations to the other statistics does not
get obscured by the normalization we used above). The rst-best expected utility,
24Note that this question is not identical to the question of utility comparisons.
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attained by choosing the mean in each coordinate, decreases as variances increase and
is given by
 E(X   X)2   E(Y   Y )2 =  2X   2Y :
The expected utility of rotated medians with angle  is given by
U () =  2X   2Y  
 
  () m  ()
2    + () m+ ()2 :
Thus, the relative e¢ ciency of the rotation with angle  is given by:
EF () =
2X + 
2
Y
2X + 
2
Y +
 
  () m  ()
2
+
 
+ () m+ ()
2  1:
Two forces play here a role: on the one hand, a distribution that is concentrated
around a central location (such as the mean or the median) will have a small di¤erence
between mean and median, which tends to increase the relative e¢ ciency. On the
other hand, such a distribution also has a low variance so that the di¤erence between
mean and median plays a bigger overall role.25 The rst-best outcome can be attained
by majority voting (in the limit with a large number of agents) if the distributions of
both X and Y are symmetric around their respective means (e.g., both are normally
distributed). In this case we have   () = m  () and + () = m+ ().
A random variableX has increasing failure rate (IFR) if its hazard rate f (x) = (1  F (x))
is increasing in x.
Theorem 2 The following relative e¢ ciency bounds hold:
1. For any random variables X and Y and for any angle , EF ()  1
2
.
2. For any unimodal random variables X and Y and for any angle , EF () > 5
8
.
3. For any random variables X and Y that have an increasing failure rate (IFR)
and that satisfy X  mX and Y  mY , and for any angle ; EF () > 0:603.
In addition, if X and Y are I.I.D., then EF (
4
)  0:753.
4. For any X and Y that are identically distributed and for any angle , EF (
4
) 
22X
32X+Cov(X;Y )
. Thus, when X and Y are independent, EF (
4
)  2
3
. In the polar,
co-monotonic scenario, EF (
4
) = EF (0)  1
2
and welfare cannot be improved
by rotation.26
25It is interesting to note that the covariance ofX and Y does not play a direct role in the e¢ ciency
calculations: it only enters in the way medians of convolutions are calculated.
26A random vector is co-monotonic if and only if it agrees in distribution with a random vector
where all components are non-decreasing functions (or all are non-increasing functions) of the same
random variable.
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5. If X and Y are I.I.D. and if each has a log-concave density, then EF (
4
) 
0:876.
Proof. 1. A classical inequality due to Hotelling and Solomons [1932] says that the
squared distance between the mean and median of any random variable is always
less than the variance:
( m)2  2:
Therefore, 
  () m  ()
2  2 () = 2X cos2  + 2Y sin2    2 sin  cos Cov(X; Y ); 
+ () m+ ()
2  2+() = 2X sin2  + 2Y cos2  + 2 sin  cos Cov(X; Y ):
We obtain the universal bound:
EF ()  
2
X + 
2
Y
22X + 2
2
Y
=
1
2
:
2. For the class of unimodal distributions the squared distance between mean
and median is at most 3
5
variance (see Basu and DasGupta [1997]). Thus, for such
distributions we get:
EF ()  
2
X + 
2
Y
(2X + 
2
Y ) +
3
5
(2X + 
2
Y )
=
5
8
:
3. For the class of distributions with an increasing failure rate (IFR), if X  mX ,
then we obtain from Rychlik [2000] that
(X  mX)2
2
 (  log(
1
2
)  1
2
)2
3
4
+ log(1
2
)
= 0:656;
and hence an e¢ ciency rate of
EF ()  
2
X + 
2
Y
(2X + 
2
Y ) + 0:656(
2
X + 
2
Y )
=
1
1 + 0:656
= 0:603.
If in addition, X and Y are I.I.D., then the convolution of two such variables is again
IFR (see Barlow and Proschan [1965]) and we obtain
EF (

4
)  2
2
X
22X + 0:656
2
X
= 0:753.
4. If X distributes as Y (not necessarily independent), we know that X   Y is
symmetric and hence that m 
 

4

=  
 

4

= 0. This yields:
EF (

4
) =
22X
22X +
 
+
 

4
 m+  4 2 
22X
32X + Cov(X; Y )
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Assume that (X1; Y1) and (X2; Y2) belong to the same Frechet class M(F1; F2) of bi-
variate distributions with xed marginals F1 and F2: Moreover, assume that (X1; Y1)
PQD (X2; Y2) where PQD stands for the positive quadrant order (see Lehmann
[1966]). This stochastic order measures the amount of positive dependence of the un-
derlying random vectors.27 We obtain that all one-dimensional variances are identical,
but that Cov(X1; Y1)  Cov(X2; Y2): Thus, the worst case e¢ ciency bound is higher
when the variates are less positive dependent. In particular, for given marginals, the
highest worst-case e¢ ciency of the 
4
rotation is achieved for the I.I.D. case where
Cov(X; Y ) = 0, and where:
EF (

4
)  2
2
X
32X
=
2
3
:
The polar case to independence is the case where X and Y are co-monotonic. Then
their covariance is maximized for given marginals, and their convolution is quantile-
additive (see Kaas et al. [2002]). In other words, quantiles and thus medians (i.e., the
50% quantile) are linear functions. Hence we obtain for the median that m+(4 ) =p
2mX : Hence, 
+

4

 m+

4
2
= (X  mX)2  22X
and we obtain
EF (

4
) = EF (0)  1
2
:
This holds analogously for any other rotation.
5. Consider now the I.I.D. case with log-concave densities.28 Then X and Y
are unimodal. Their convolution is log-concave (Prekopa [1973]), and hence also
unimodal.29 Let fX = fY denote the respective log-concave densities. Bobkov and
Ledoux [2014] prove that:30
1
122X
 f 2X(mX) 
1
22X
:
On the other hand, Ball and Böröczky [2010] prove that:
fX(mX)  jmX   X j  ln
r
e
2

:
27It is implied, for example, by the supermodular order.
28Note that any log-concave distribution on the plane yields log-concave marginals (Prekopa
[1973]).
29The convolution of unimodal densities need not be unimodal. But the convolution of X and Y
is unimodal for any Y if and only if X is log-concave (see Ibragimov [1956]).
30Interestingly enough, the left hand side of the inequality applies to any probabiliy density on
the real line.
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Combining the two inequalities above yields
(mX   X)2 
1
f 2X(mX)
ln2
r
e
2

 122X ln2
r
e
2

:
The e¢ ciency bound in the log-concave case becomes then
EF (

4
)  2
2
X
22X + 12
2
X ln
2
 p
e
2
 = 1
1 + 6 ln2
 p
e
2
 = 0:876:
The above calculations also show that the improvement obtained by rotation may
be signicant. Just to give one example, consider the original (e.g., unrotated) distri-
butions for which the Hotelling-Solomons bound is achieved with equality.31 Then,
the welfare in the I.I.D. case without rotation is exactly half of the rst-best welfare,
while the welfare following the 45 degree rotation is at least two-thirds of the original
rst best, yielding an improvement of at least 30%.
In Appendix B, we show how the above bounds can be obtained for the case of
more dimensions. For example, in the I.I.D, case, the relative e¢ ciency tends to 1
when the number of dimensions becomes innite.
5 Extension to Other Utility Functions
In this section we briey illustrate how our method can be applied to a more general
class of utility functions that are based on a distance generated by an inner product.
Thus, we assume that the utility of agent i with peak ti from decision v 2D  R2 is
given by
  (jjti   vjjI) ;
where jjjjI is some inner-product norm, and where  is a strictly monotonically
increasing function.
Since inner-product norms are strictly convex, choosing a marginal median with
respect to any orthogonal coordinates yields a DIC mechanism (see Peters et al.
[1993]).32 Recall that two vectors are orthogonal if their inner-product (that induces
the distance function) is zero.
31This is a discrete distribution concentrated on two points. But, it can be easily approximated
by continuous distribution that satisfy the bound with almost equality, for any needed degree of
precision.
32These authors also show that, as in the case of the Euclidean norm in the plane, the class of
marginal medians coincides with the class of DIC, anonymous and Pareto e¢ cient mechanims.
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For the Euclidean norm, every rotation is an isometry that xes the origin and
preserves orthogonality and orientation: it transforms a basis of orthogonal vectors
into another such basis, and each oriented orthogonal basis is obtained (modulo trans-
lation) from another via a suitable rotation.
In order to proceed in an analogous fashion, we need to rst identify the set of
isometries: for any inner product norm jjjjI this is always an innite multiplicative
group (see Garcia-Roig [1997]). Because medians and welfare measures that are based
on distances are translation equivariant, it is enough, as above, to characterize the
sub-group of isometries that x the origin and that preserve orientation (i.e., their
corresponding matrices have determinant +1). We start with the simplest case.
5.1 Weighted Euclidean Norm
An agent with ideal point ti = (xi; yi) has a weighted Euclidean preference over points
v = (x; y) given by
 2 (x  xi)2   (y   yi)2 ,
with  > 0. Note that, without loss of generality, we can always normalize one of the
weights to be +1 without changing the underlying (ordinal) preferences. Let
M =
 
2 0
0 1
!
;
and dene an inner-product and its associated norm by:
h(x1; y1); (x2; y2)i  (x1; y1)M(x2; y2)T ;
jj(x; y)jj 
p
(x; y)M(x; y)T =
q
2x2 + y2:
The unit circleis here an ellipse
2x2 + y2 = 1;
with axes parallel to the standard Cartesian coordinate axes. Isometries that x the
origin leave this ellipse invariant (i.e., a point on the ellipse is translated to another
point on the ellipse) and can be represented by generalized rotationmatrices of the
form
R() =
 
cos    1

sin 
 sin  cos 
!
:
While the mean in each coordinate is still the rst-best, the welfare measure
changes to incorporate the weight . By normalizing the mean to zero, the welfare
maximization problem becomes:
min

[2m2  () +m
2
+ () + 
22X + 
2
Y ], min

[2m2  () +m
2
+ ()];
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where
m  () = median (X cos    1

Y sin );
m+ () = median (X sin  + Y cos ):
As before, it is straightforward to verify that the minimum attained by any angle
 2 [=2; 2] can be attained by an angle  2 [0; =2]. Hence, it is without loss of
generality to restrict attention to  2 [0; =2]. Instead of  = =4; the rotation that
yields m  () = 0 is dened here by
cos  =
1

sin  ,  = arctan :
We now show that Theorem 1 continues to hold:
Theorem 3 Assume that X and Y are independent. The rotation with angle  = 0 is
a local utility minimum if
mXf
0
X (mX)  0;mY f 0Y (mY )  0; 2m2X +m2Y 6= 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is also straightforward to derive e¢ ciency bounds. Here are two examples:
1) The universal bound based on the Hotelling-Solomons inequality (without any
assumption on the underlying random variables) remains 1
2
, independently of . 2)
If X and Y are independent, using the generalized rotation where  = arctan , we
obtain
EF (arctan )  1 + 
2
1 + 22 + (1  2) cos2(arctan ) :
We depict below the bound as a function of  (recall that EF (
4
)  2
3
with  = 1).
Note that the bound tends back to the universal Hotelling-Solomons bound 1
2
for
 ! 0 and for  ! 1. This is intuitive since in those limit cases one dimension
becomes irrelevant and we obtain in the limit a one-dimensional voting problem where
rotationscannot help.
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Figure 5. Bound on relative e¢ ciency for I.I.D. random variables.
5.2 General Inner Product Norm
Consider next a general norm dened by an inner-product. Such a norm is generated
by a symmetric, positive denite matrix Q:
jj(x; y)jj 
p
(x; y)Q (x; y)T :
The unit circleis now an ellipse that is possibly tilted with respect to the standard
coordinates. Let AQ be the orthogonal matrix representing the change of variables
that diagonalizes Q; and let MQ be the obtained diagonal matrix.33 Then MQ is
the matrix of a weighted Euclidean inner product, as explained above. The set of
isometries that x the origin and preserve orientation is thus given here by the com-
position:
AQRMQ ()A
 1
Q ;
where RMQ () is the set of generalized rotations that keep invariant the untilted unit
ellipse associated to the diagonal matrixMQ, as explained in the previous subsection.
Note that the unit circle (i.e, ellipse) of this norm has now axes that are parallel to
the coordinate axes dened by the change of variables AQ. In particular, the relevant
zero rotation is the one corresponding to these new variables; it is sub-optimal if
the distribution of peaks has independent projections on these coordinates (rather
than on the standard Cartesian ones).
33Note that any symmetric, positive denite matrix can indeed be diagonalized, and its two
eigenvalues are always real.
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6 Concluding Remarks
A re-denition of issues facilitates the search for consensus among ex-ante conicting
interests. We have shown that voting by simple majority on each dimension becomes
a highly e¤ective aggregation mechanism when combined with a judicious choice of
the issues that are put up for vote. Our study endogenizes the process by which
a structure induced equilibrium can be reached in a complex multi-dimensional
collective decision problem with incomplete information about preferences. While we
have focused on welfare maximization, other goals (such as maximizing the utility of
an agenda setter) can be analyzed by the same methods.
7 Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
In order to show that  = 0 is suboptimal, it is su¢ cient to show that
m (0)m0 (0) +m+(0)m
0
+(0) = 0; (11)
and that
m00 (0)m (0) + (m
0
 (0))
2 +m00+(0)m+(0) + (m
0
+(0))
2 < 0: (12)
By the denition of m+ () ;
1
2
= FX sin +Y cos  (m+ ())
=
Z 1
 1
Pr

Y <
m+ ()  x sin 
cos 

fX (x) dx
=
Z 1
 1
FY

m+ ()  x sin 
cos 

fX (x) dx
Since the above identity holds for all , we take the derivative with respect to  and
obtain
0 =
Z 1
 1
fY

m+ ()  x sin 
cos 

m0+ () cos    x+m+ () sin 
cos2 

fX (x) dx (13)
Taking the second derivative with respect to , we obtain
0 =
Z 1
 1
f 0Y

m+ ()  x sin 
cos 

m0+ () cos    x+m+ () sin 
cos2 
2
fX (x) dx
+
Z 1
 1
fY

m+() x sin 
cos 

cos4 
 
m00+ () cos  +m+ () cos 

cos2 
+2 cos  sin 
 
m0+ () cos    x+m+ () sin 
 ! fX (x) dx
(14)
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If  = 0, then conditions (13) and (14) reduce to
0 =
Z 1
 1
fY (m+ (0))
 
m0+ (0)  x

fX (x) dx (15)
and
0 =
Z 1
 1
f 0Y (m+ (0))
 
m0+ (0)  x
2
fX (x) dx+
Z 1
 1
fY (m+ (0))
 
m00+ (0) +m+ (0)

fX (x) dx
(16)
Note that m+ (0) = mY ; so it follows from (15) that
m0+ (0) =
fY (mY )
R1
 1 xfX (x) dx
fY (mY )
R1
 1 fX (x) dx
= X = 0;
and follows from (16) that
m00+ (0) =  mY  
f 0Y (mY )
fY (mY )
Z 1
 1
x2fX (x) dx:
Similarly, we can write
1
2
= FX cos  Y sin  (m  ()) =
Z 1
 1
FX

m  () + y sin 
cos 

fY (y) dy
Taking the derivative with respect to , we obtain
0 =
Z 1
 1
fX

m  () + y sin 
cos 

m0  () cos  + y +m  () sin 
cos2 

fY (y) dy
Taking the second derivative with respect to , we obtain
0 =
Z 1
 1
f 0X

m  () + y sin 
cos 

m0  () cos  + y +m  () sin 
cos2 
2
fY (y) dy
+
Z 1
 1
fX

m ()+y sin 
cos 

cos4 
 
m00  () cos  +m  () cos 

cos2 
+2 cos  sin 

m0  () cos  + y +m  () sin 
 ! fY (y) dy
If  = 0, then the above two conditions reduce to
0 =
Z 1
 1
fX (m  (0))
 
m0  (0) + y

fY (y) dy
and
0 =
Z 1
 1
f 0X (m  (0))
 
m0  (0) + y
2
fY (y) dy+
Z 1
 1
fX (m  (0))
 
m00  (0) +m  (0)

fY (y) dy
Since m  (0) = mX , we have
m0  (0) =  
R1
 1 yfY (y) dyR1
 1 fY (y) dy
=  Y = 0
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and
m00  (0) =  mX  
f 0X (mX)
fX (mX)
Z 1
 1
y2fY (y) dy
Therefore, the rst-order condition (11) holds because m0  (0) = m
0
+ (0) = 0. For
the second order condition (12), note that
m00 (0)m (0) + (m
0
 (0))
2 +m00+(0)m+(0) + (m
0
+(0))
2
= mX

 mX   f
0
X (mX)
fX (mX)
Z 1
 1
y2fY (y) dy

+mY

 mY   f
0
Y (mY )
fY (mY )
Z 1
 1
x2fX (x) dx

=  m2X  m2Y  mX
f 0X (mX)
fX (mX)
Z 1
 1
y2fY (y) dy  mY f
0
Y (mY )
fY (mY )
Z 1
 1
x2fX (x) dx
As a result, condition (12) is equivalent to
m2X +m
2
Y +mX
f 0X (mX)
fX (mX)
Z 1
 1
y2fY (y) dy +mY
f 0Y (mY )
fY (mY )
Z 1
 1
x2fX (x) dx > 0:
Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for the sub-optimality of zero rotation is
mXf
0
X (mX)  0;mY f 0Y (mY )  0 and m2X +m2Y 6= 0:
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
If X and Y are I.I.D., then we have
m  (=4) = 0 and m+ (=4) =
p
2
2
mX+Y :
Therefore,  = =4 is a critical point if
0 = m  (=4)m0  (=4) +m+ (=4)m
0
+ (=4) =
p
2
2
mX+Ym
0
+ (=4) :
Recall (13) from the proof of Theorem 1 that
0 =
Z 1
 1
fY

m+ ()  x sin 
cos 

m0+ () cos    x+m+ () sin 
cos2 

fX (x) dx:
Hence, if X and Y are I.I.D. and  = =4, we have
0 =
Z 1
 1
fX
p
2m+ (=4)  x
p
2m0+ (=4)  2x+
p
2m+ (=4)

fX (x) dx:
It follows from the convolution of the distributions for X and Y that
p
2m0+ (=4) fX+Y
p
2m+ (=4)

=
Z 1
 1
fX
p
2m+ (=4)  x

2x 
p
2m+ (=4)

fX (x) dx:
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Note that by change of variable y =
p
2m+ (=4)  x, we haveZ 1
 1
f 0X
p
2m+ (=4)  x

2x 
p
2m+ (=4)
2
fX (x) dx
=
Z 1
 1
f 0X (y)

2y  
p
2m+ (=4)
2
fX
p
2m+ (=4)  y

dy:
Therefore,
0 =
Z 1
 1
h
f 0X
p
2m+ (=4)  x

fX (x)  f 0X (x) fX
p
2m+ (=4)  x
i
2x 
p
2m+ (=4)
2
dx
=

fX
p
2m+ (=4)  x

fX (x)

2x 
p
2m+ (=4)
21
 1
 
Z 1
 1
fX
p
2m+ (=4)  x

fX (x) 4

2x 
p
2m+ (=4)

dx
= 4
p
2m0+ (=4) fX+Y
p
2m+ (=4)

where we use the assumption that
lim
x!1
fX
p
2m+ (=4)  x

fX (x)

2x 
p
2m+ (=4)
2
= lim
x! 1
fX
p
2m+ (=4)  x

fX (x)

2x 
p
2m+ (=4)
2
= 0:
Therefore, m0+ (=4) = 0. It follows that
p
2mX+Ym
0
+ (=4) = 0; so  = =4 is indeed
a critical point.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove the case where mX < X . The case mX > X is analogous. In order to
show that =4 is globally optimal, it is su¢ cient to show for any  2 [1=2; 1],
mX  mpX1+p1 X2  mp2
2
X1+
p
2
2
X2
< 0 = X : (17)
Schur-concavity of Pr (X sin  + Y cos   z) in (sin2 ; cos2 ) for all  2 0; 
4

and
all z 2 [mX ; 0] is equivalent to
h ()  Pr
p
X1 +
p
1  X2  z

is weakly increasing in  for all z 2 [mX ; 0] :
(18)
Now suppose condition (18) holds. It implies that
Pr
p
X1 +
p
1  X2  mX

 Pr (X1  mX) = 1
2
) mX  mpX1+p1 X2 :
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Furthermore, (18) implies that, for all  2 [1=2; 1],
Pr
 p
2
2
X1 +
p
2
2
X2  mpX1+p1 X2
!
 Pr
p
X1 +
p
1  X2  mpX1+p1 X2

=
1
2
:
which implies
mpX1+
p
1 X2  mp2
2
X1+
p
2
2
X2
:
Condition (17) then follows immediately, and thus the =4-rotation is optimal.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that FX (mX + ") + FX (mX   ")  1 for all " > 0. The other case is
completely analogous. We rst use an argument by van Zwet [1979] to claim that
mX < X . Note that
mX   X =
Z mX
 1
(mX   x) fX (x) dx+
Z 1
mX
(mX   x) fX (x) dx
=
Z mX
 1
FX (x) dx 
Z 1
mX
(1  FX (x)) dx
=
Z 1
0
[FX (mX   x) + FX (mX + x)  1] dx
It follows from mX 6= X that mX < X . It also implies that FX (mX   x) +
FX (mX + x)  1 < 0 for some set of x with positive measure.
Next, we use an argument adapted from Watson and Gordon [1986] to prove that
the median function is super-additive. The super-additivity of the median function
is equivalent to
Pr (X + Y < mX +mY ) <
1
2
(19)
Note that
Pr (X + Y < mX +mY )
=
Z 1
mY
Z mX+mY  y
 1
fX (x) fY (y) dxdy +
Z mY
 1
Z mX
 1
fX (x) fY (y) dxdy
+
Z 1
mX
Z mX+mY  x
 1
fX (x) fY (y) dydx
=
Z 1
mY
FX (mX +mY   y) fY (y) dy + 1
4
+
Z 1
mX
fX (x)FY (mX +mY   x) dx
=
Z 1
0
FX (mX   ") fY (mY + ") d"+
Z 1
0
fX (mX + ")FY (mY   ") d"+ 1
4
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Therefore, condition (19) is equivalent to
4
Z 1
0
FX (mX   ") fY (mY + ") d"+ 4
Z 1
0
fX (mX + ")FY (mY   ") d" < 1 (20)
Let us dene non-negative random variables X+; X ; Y +; Y   as
X+ = X  mX jX  mX and X  = mX  XjX  mX
Y + = Y  mY jY  mY and Y   = mY   Y jY  mY
Then
Pr
 
X  > Y +

=
Z 1
0
2FX (mX   ") 2fY (mX + ") d"
Pr
 
Y   > X+

=
Z 1
0
2FY (mX   ") 2fX (mX + ") dx
Therefore, condition (20) is equivalent to
Pr
 
X  > Y +

+ Pr
 
Y   > X+

< 1 (21)
A su¢ cient condition for (21) is
Pr
 
X+ < "
  Pr  X  < " and Pr  Y + < "  Pr  Y   < " (22)
for all " > 0 , and with strict inequality for some open interval of ", because by setting
" = Y + and " = X+, respectively, we obtain
Pr
 
X+ < Y +

< Pr
 
X  < Y +

and Pr
 
Y + < X+

< Pr
 
Y   < X+

and thus (21). Since X and Y are I.I.D., the su¢ cient condition (22) reduces to
Pr
 
X+ < "
  Pr  X  < " for all " > 0.
Equivalently,
Pr (X  mX < ")  Pr (mX  X < ") :
which simplies into the rst inequality in (9). As we argued above, since mX 6= X ,
we must have FX (mX   ") +FX (mX + ")  1 < 0 for some positive measure of ", as
desired.
Finally, we show that condition (10) ((9), respectively) is satised if FX is strictly
convex (concave, respectively). Note that F (X) is uniformly distributed, so that
E [F (X)] = 1=2. Suppose here that F is strictly convex. The concave case can be
proved analogously. By Jensens inequality
F (mX) =
1
2
= E [F (X)] > F (E [X]) = F (X) :
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Hence, mX > X . In order to show that mX + mY > mX+Y , it is su¢ cient to show
that
FX (mX + ") + FX (mX   ")  1 for all " > 0:
Note that fX (mX + ") fX (mX   ") > 0 by strict convexity of F , so FX (mX + ")+
FX (mX   ") is increasing in " and reaches a minimum at " = 0. Since FX (mX) +
FX (mX) = 1, we must have FX (mX + ") + FX (mX   ")  1 for all " > 0.
7.5 Examples for Section 3.3
We show here how the super-additivity condition of median is satised for two well-
known families of distributions where condition (9) is not easily checked, or does not
hold.34
Consider rst the large and important family of gamma distributions with density
f; (x) =

  ()
x 1e x for x > 0:
This family contains the exponential (that can be obtained by setting  = 1) and
many other well known distributions. For any constant c > 0; the random variable
cX is also gamma with parameters  and =c. If X and Y are independent gamma
with parameters (X ; ) and (Y ; ), respectively, then X + Y is also gamma with
parameters (X +Y ; ). Thus, the gamma family is closed under scaling and under
convolution. In a classic study, Bock et al. [1987] showed that Pr (aX + bY  t),
0  a; b  1, is Schur-convex in (a; b) for all t  X . Since (1; 0) 
 
1
2
; 1
2

, we have
F 1
2
X+ 1
2
Y (t)  FX(t) for all t  X . Note that mX < X for gamma distributions
(Groeneveld and Meeden [1977]), so we have m 1
2
X+ 1
2
Y  mX as desired.35
A second family is the Rayleigh distribution with cumulative distribution
F (x) = 1  e x2 for x  0:
34Although the super-additivity (or sub-additivity) condition is derived for normalized distribu-
tions, it is straightward to verify that it is also su¢ cient for original distributions.
35Alternatively, let m(; ) denote the median of gamma random variable X with parameters 
and . Then m(; ) = m(; 1)=. Note that
U(

4
) =  22 (; )   +  m+2
=  22 (; ) 
 p
2

 
p
2
2
m(2; 1)
!2
=  22 (; )  1
22
(2 m(2; 1))2
and
U(0) =  22(; )  2 (X  mX)2 =  22(; ) 
2
2
( m(; 1))2:
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Suppose X; Y are I.I.D. distributed according to Rayleigh.36 Then, according to
Lemma 4 in Hu and Lin [2000], we have
Pr (X cos  + Y sin   z) = 1 
Z =2
0
sin(2)
 
1 + 2(;  ; z)

e 
2(; ;z)d
where (;  ; z) = z= cos(   ). The medians of X and of Y are mX = mY =
p
ln 2.
It can be (numerically) veried that
Pr

(X + Y ) =
p
2 
p
2mX

= 1 
Z =2
0
sin(2)

1 + 2(

4
;  ;
p
2 ln 2)

e 
2(
4
; ;
p
2 ln 2)d
 0:4658
< 0:5
= Pr

(X + Y ) =
p
2  m+(=4)

where the last equality follows from the denition of m+(4 ). Hence, m+(

4
) >
p
2mX
as desired.
By assuming independence between X and Y , we were able to derive operational,
su¢ cient conditions for the =4 rotation to dominate the zero rotation, but indepen-
dence is not necessary. We now present an example where, even though X and Y are
correlated, the median function is super-additive (sub-additive) so the =4 rotation
is welfare superior to the zero rotation. The standard tool we use to model corre-
lation between X and Y for given marginals is the copula (see Nelson [2006] for an
introduction).
Example 3 Suppose that X and Y are identically distributed on [0; 1] with marginals
FX (x) = x
2 and FY (y) = y2. To model correlation between X and Y , we consider
here the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM) copula
C (p; q) = pq + pq (1  p) (1  q)
Therefore,
U(

4
) > U (0) , 1
22
(2 m(2; 1))2 < 2
2
( m(; 1))2
, (2 m(2; 1))2 < 4( m(; 1))2
, m2(2; 1)  4m(2; 1) < 4m2(; 1)  8m(; 1)
, m(2; 1) > 2m(; 1):
The last inequality holds because, as shown in Berg and Pedersen [2008], m(; 1) is convex in .
36If Z1; Z2 is a random sample of size 2 from a normal distribution N(0; 1) then the distribution
of X =
p
Z21 + Z
2
2 is Rayleigh: In other words, the Rayleigh is the distribution of the norm of a
two-dimensional random vector whose coordinates are normally distributed.
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with p; q 2 [0; 1] and  2 [ 1; 1]. The correlation coe¢ cient for FGM copula is
 = =3 2 [ 1=3; 1=3]. It follows from the Sklar theorem that we can write the joint
distribution F (x; y) in terms of its marginals and a copula C (p; q):
F (x; y) = C (FX (x) ; FY (y)) :
With some algebra, we can derive the joint density as
f (x; y) = 4xy + 4xy
 
2x2   1  2y2   1 :
Therefore, as in the proof of Proposition 3, we can write Pr (X + Y < mX +mY ) as
2
Z 1
mY
Z mX+mY  y
0
f (x; y) dxdy +
Z mY
0
Z mX
0
f (x; y) dxdy
= 2
Z 1
p
2=2
Z p2 y
0
 
4xy + 4xy
 
2x2   1  2y2   1 dxdy
+
Z p2=2
0
Z p2=2
0
 
4xy + 4xy
 
2x2   1  2y2   1 dxdy
=

146
35
  104
35
p
2

   8
3
p
2 +
13
3
> 0:5
for all  2 [ 1; 1]. Consequently, we have mX+Y < mX + mY . Since FX (x) = x2
is convex, X < mX . It follows that the =4-rotation dominates the zero-rotation in
ex ante welfare. Alternatively, suppose FX (x) =
p
x and FY (y) =
p
y. If we again
restrict attention to the FGM copula, we can follow the same procedure to show that
mX+Y > mX +mY and X > mX .
7.6 Proof of Theorem 3
The proof follows the same steps as in proving Theorem 1. In order to show that
 = 0 is suboptimal, it is su¢ cient to show
2m (0)m0 (0) +m+(0)m
0
+(0) = 0; (23)
and
2m00 (0)m (0) + 
2(m0 (0))
2 +m00+(0)m+(0) + (m
0
+(0))
2 < 0: (24)
By denition of m+ (), we note that
1
2
= FX sin +Y cos  (m+ ())
=
Z 1
 1
Pr

Y <
m+ ()  x sin 
cos 

fX (x) dx
=
Z 1
 1
FY

m+ ()  x sin 
cos 

fX (x) dx
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Since it holds for all , we take a derivative with respect to  to obtain
0 =
Z 1
 1
fY

m+ ()  x sin 
cos 

m0+ () cos    x+m+ () sin 
cos2 

fX (x) dx
(25)
By taking the second derivative with respect to , we obtain
0 =
Z 1
 1
f 0Y

m+ ()  x sin 
cos 

m0+ () cos    x+m+ () sin 
cos2 
2
fX (x) dx
+
Z 1
 1
fY

m+() x sin 
cos 

cos4 
 
m00+ () cos  +m+ () cos 

cos2 
+2 cos  sin 
 
m0+ () cos    x+m+ () sin 
 ! fX (x) dx
(26)
If  = 0, then conditions (25) and (26) reduce to
0 =
Z 1
 1
fY (m+ (0))
 
m0+ (0)  x

fX (x) dx
and
0 =
Z 1
 1
f 0Y (m+ (0))
 
m0+ (0)  x
2
fX (x) dx+
Z 1
 1
fY (m+ (0))
 
m00+ (0) +m+ (0)

fX (x) dx
Note that m+ (0) = mY , so that we have
m0+ (0) =
fY (mY )
R1
 1 xfX (x) dx
fY (mY )
R1
 1 fX (x) dx
= X = 0;
and
m00+ (0) =  mY  
f 0Y (mY )
fY (mY )
Z 1
 1
x2fX (x) dx:
Similarly, we can write
1
2
= FX cos   1

Y sin  (m  ()) =
Z 1
 1
FX
 
m  () + 1y sin 
cos 
!
fY (y) dy
Taking the derivative with respect to , we obtain
0 =
Z 1
 1
fX
 
m  () + 1y sin 
cos 
! 
m0  () cos  +
1

y +m  () sin 
cos2 
!
fY (y) dy
Taking the second derivative with respect to , we obtain
0 =
Z 1
 1
f 0X
 
m  () + 1y sin 
cos 
! 
m0  () cos  +
1

y +m  () sin 
cos2 
!2
fY (y) dy
+
Z 1
 1
fX

m ()+ 1 y sin 
cos 

cos4 
 
m00  () cos  +m  () cos 

cos2 
+2 cos  sin 
h
m0  () cos  +
1

y +m  () sin 
i ! fY (y) dy
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If  = 0, then the above two conditions reduce to
0 =
Z 1
 1
fX (m  (0))

m0  (0) +
1

y

fY (y) dy
and
0 =
Z 1
 1
f 0X (m  (0))

m0  (0) +
1

y
2
fY (y) dy+
Z 1
 1
fX (m  (0))
 
m00  (0) +m  (0)

fY (y) dy
Since m  (0) = mX , we have
m0  (0) =  
1

R1
 1 yfY (y) dyR1
 1 fY (y) dy
=   1

Y = 0
and
m00  (0) =  mX  
f 0X (mX)
fX (mX)
Z 1
 1
1
2
y2fY (y) dy
Therefore, the rst-order condition (23) holds because m0  (0) = m
0
+ (0) = 0.
For the second-order condition (24), note that
2m00 (0)m (0) + 
2(m0 (0))
2 +m00+(0)m+(0) + (m
0
+(0))
2
= 2mX

 mX   f
0
X (mX)
fX (mX)
Z 1
 1
1
2
y2fY (y) dy

+mY

 mY   f
0
Y (mY )
fY (mY )
Z 1
 1
2x2fX (x) dx

=  2m2X  m2Y  mX
f 0X (mX)
fX (mX)
Z 1
 1
y2fY (y) dy  mY f
0
Y (mY )
fY (mY )
Z 1
 1
2x2fX (x) dx
As a result, condition (24) is equivalent to
2m2X +m
2
Y +mX
f 0X (mX)
fX (mX)
Z 1
 1
y2fY (y) dy +mY
f 0Y (mY )
fY (mY )
Z 1
 1
2x2fX (x) dx > 0:
Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for the sub-optimality of zero rotation is
mXf
0
X (mX)  0;mY f 0Y (mY )  0 and 2m2X +m2Y 6= 0:
8 Appendix B: More than Two Dimensions
In this appendix, we sketch the generalizations of our main results (Theorems 1-2) to
higher dimensions. Consider K independent issues, denoted by Xk, k = 1; :::; K. We
writeX = (X1; :::; XK)
T and assume that all random variablesXk are normalized. Let
SOK denote the special orthogonal group in dimension K which consists of K  K
orthogonal matrices with determinant +1. This group is isomorphic to the set of
rotations in RK : A K K orthogonal matrix Q 2 SOK is a real matrix with
QTQ = QQT = I
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where QT is the transpose of Q, and where I is the K  K identity matrix. As a
result
Q 1 = QT .
Each K  K special orthogonal matrix Q transforms an orthogonal system X into
another orthogonal system while preserving the orientation in RK . The transformed
orthogonal system X is denoted as QX. The planners objective is to choose Q in
order to maximize welfare.
8.1 The (Sub)-Optimality of the Zero- and =4-Rotations
Theorem 1 can be easily extended to higher dimensions by applying our previous
two-dimensional analysis to rotations of the rst two dimensions only (while keeping
all other dimensions xed).
Suppose now that X1; :::; XK are I.I.D. drawn from a common distribution. What
is the counterpart of =4 rotation (or equivalently the top-down procedure) in higher
dimensions? We look for an orthogonal matrix Q that transforms X into a new
vector QX whose one coordinate is given by the sum X1 + ::: + XK while the other
coordinates consists of various di¤erences. For example, if K = 4, the orthogonal
matrix Q (with determinant equal to +1) is given by0BBB@
1
2
1
2
 1
2
 1
2
1
2
 1
2
 1
2
1
2
 1
2
1
2
 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1CCCA
0BBB@
X1
X2
X3
X4
1CCCA = 12
0BBB@
X1 +X2  X3  X4
X1 +X4  X2  X3
X2 +X4  X1  X3
X1 +X2 +X3 +X4
1CCCA
More generally, consider an orthogonal matrix bQ with
1p
K
bQij = ( either 1 or   1 for all j if i 6= K
1 for all j if i = K
(27)
such that for all k 6= K, bQkX contains an equal number of Xks appearing with
positive and negative signs. The matrix bQk is a Hadamard matrix, and the order of
such a matrix must be 1; 2 or a multiple of 4. Sylvester [1867] constructed Hadamard
matrices of order 2k for every non-negative integer k.37 In those cases it is easy to see
that the same condition we had before, namely the super-additivity of the median
function, is again su¢ cient for the =4-rotation to dominate the zero-rotation.
37The existence of Hadamard matrices of order 4k for every positive integer k is the well-known
Hadamard conjecture. It was proven for all k up to 167:
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8.2 E¢ ciency Bounds
As in the main text, we work here with the non-normalized random variablesX1; :::; XK .
With K dimensions, the expected utility of choosing marginal medians under an or-
thogonal transformation Q is given by
U (Q) =  E jjQX median(QX)jj2 =  
KX
k=1
var (QkX) 
KX
k=1
(mean (QkX) median(QkX))2
whereQk is the k-th row of theQmatrix. The rst-best expected utility is 
PK
k=1var(QkX).
We dene the relative e¢ ciency of transformation Q relative to the rst-best as:
EF (Q) 
PK
k=1 var (QkX)PK
k=1 var (QkX) +
PK
k=1 (mean (QkX) median(QkX))2
Again, we can apply the Hotelling-Solomons inequality to obtain that
EF (I) 
PK
k=1 var (QkX)PK
k=1 var (QkX) +
PK
k=1 var (QkX)
=
1
2
Analogously, we can use the Basu-DasGupta inequality to show that, for unimodal
distributions, we have
EF (I) 
PK
k=1 var (QkX)PK
k=1 var (QkX) +
3
5
PK
k=1 var (QkX)
=
5
8
Now consider any even numberK such that the Hadamard matrix exists. Suppose
X1; :::; XK are I.I.D. with log-concave densities. Consider again an orthogonal matrixbQ given in (27). It follows from the I.I.D. assumption that
mean( bQkX) median( bQkX) = ( 0 if k 6= K;1p
K
(mean(
PK
k=1Xk) median(
PK
k=1Xk)) if k = K:
Therefore, we have
EF ( bQ) = PKk=1 var( bQkX)PK
k=1 var( bQkX) + 1K mean(PKk=1Xk) median(PKk=1Xk)2
Given that X1; :::; XK have log-concave densities, the convolution Z 
PK
k=1Xk
also has a log-concave densities. Then the inequalities of Bobkov and Ledoux [2014]
and of Ball and Böröczky [2010] together imply
(mZ   Z)2 
1
f 2Z(mZ)
ln2
r
e
2

 122Z ln2
r
e
2

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Hence,
EF ( bQ)  PKk=1 var( bQkX)PK
k=1 var( bQkX) + 1K 122Z ln2  p e2
Let 2Xk denote the variance of Xk. Then we have 
2
Z = K
2
Xk
and
var( bQkX) = bQk bQTk 2Xk = 2Xk
since bQk bQTk = I by the denition of an orthogonal matrix. Therefore, we obtain the
following e¢ ciency bound for log-concave densities
EF  EF ( bQ)  K2Xk
K2Xk + 12
2
Xk
ln2
 p
e
2
 = 1
1 + 1
K
12 ln2
 p
e
2

For example, if K = 4, the bound is 93:4%. Note that this bound is increasing the
number of dimensions K; and tends to 100% when K goes to innity.38
Remark 4 More generally, consider any I.I.D. random variables X1; :::; XK with
nite means and variances and consider K such that the Hadamard matrix exists.
Then, for the analog of the =4 rotation we obtain that
EF ( bQ) = K2Xk
K2Xk +
1
K
(mean(
PK
k=1Xk) median(
PK
k=1Xk))
2
=
2Xk
2Xk +
1
K2
(mean(
PK
k=1Xk) median(
PK
k=1Xk))
2
! 1 as K !1
where the last assertion follows from the central limit theorem.
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